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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JUDY A. CORDOVA, * 
* 
Plaintiff- * 
Appellee, * Case No. 920370-CA 
* 
v. * 
* 
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, Bureau * 
Chief, Records Bureau, Drivers* 
License Division, * 
* Argument Priority No. 16 
Defendant- * 
Appellant. * 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is in the Court of Appeals based upon Utah 
Code Ann. Sec. 78-2A-3(2)(a) (1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
A. Does the failure of an administrative agency to 
hold an informal adjudicative proceeding as required by 
statute deny a Petitioner's right to due process, and does 
it obviate the need for a trial de novo? 
B. If the district court is required to conduct a 
trial de novo, is such review Mon the record/' and therefore 
subject to the "residuum rule"? 
1 
C. Is legally incompetent evidence rendered competent 
(for purposes of the residuum rule) by a Petitioner's 
failure to object to its admissibility, where no one appears 
on behalf of the State to offer such into evidence, and 
where no foundation for its introduction has been laid? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
A copy of the determinative statute, Utah Code Ann, 
Sec. 63-46b-15 (Supp. 1992) is attached as Addendum E. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from the final judgment and decree of 
the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, The Honorable 
J. Dennis Frederick presiding. 
Appellee Judy A. Cordova's driver's license was 
suspended for a period of ninety days following a proceeding 
before the Department of Public Safety, Drivers License 
Division (the "Department"), at which neither the appellee, 
the arresting officer, nor anyone else appeared. 
Upon petition to the district court, Cordova's motion 
to vacate and set aside the administrative order suspending 
her license was granted. Final judgment was entered on May 
15, 1992, and the Notice of Appeal was filed June 5, 1992. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellee does not dispute the Statement of Facts in the 
"Brief of the Appellant" (at pages 4-6), and herein 
incorporates the statement of facts by reference. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Utah Code Ann- Sec 41-2-130(6)(a) (Supp. 1992) requires 
the Department to hold an administrative hearing at the 
request of an individual arrested for driving under the 
influence of drugs and/or alcohol, prior to the suspension 
of his or her driver's license* The failure of the 
Department to hold the hearing as Cordova requested, was a 
denial of her right to due process* Therefore, the district 
court's decision to vacate and set aside the administrative 
order should be upheld. 
POINT II 
Judicial review of the Department's informal 
adjudicative proceedings is by "on the record" trial de 
novo. Accordingly, the district court is entitled to set 
aside the action of the agency where there is not "a modicum 
of legally competent evidence" to satisfy the requirements 
of the "residuum rule." 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEPARTMENT'S FAILURE TO CONDUCT A HEARING DENIED 
CORDOVA'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS, AND WAS ADEQUATE GROUNDS FOR 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER VACATING AND SETTING ASIDE THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER OF THE DEPARTMENT. 
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A. UTAH CODE ANN. SEC, 41-2-130 REQUIRES THAT A 
HEARING BE HELD, IF REQUESTED, PRIOR TO THE SUSPENSION 
OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S DRIVER'S LICENSE. 
Cordova was not provided with the administrative 
hearing which she reguested pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 
41-2-130 (6) (a) (Supp. 1992). The statute entitles a person 
arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), 
upon reguest, to an administrative hearing before the 
Department, prior to the suspension of his or her license. 
(The statute is attached as Addendum A.) The purpose of the 
statute is undoubtedly to ensure that an individual's right 
to operate a motor vehicle is not denied without adeguate 
due process protection. 
Although a time was set for the hearing, neither 
Cordova, her attorney, the arresting officer, the operator 
of the breathilyzer, nor anyone else appeared before the 
Department. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
("Findings") at 2; Record ("R") at 45, attached as Addendum 
B.) The hearing officer simply reviewed the information 
contained in the Department's file, and made a determination 
that there was a preponderance of evidence to support the 
suspension of Cordova's license. Department Of Public 
Safety, Driver License Division, Findings of Proceedings on 
Hearings for Administrative Suspension at 4; R. at 42 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, "Transcript"). 
The action taken by the Department did not provide the 
"hearing" guaranteed under Utah Code Ann. Sec. 41-2-130. 
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The term "hearing" implies that at least one party be heard. 
A hearing is a: 
Proceeding of relative formality (though generally less 
formal then a trial), generally public, with definite 
issues of fact or of law to be tried, in which 
witnesses are heard and parties proceeded against have 
right to be heard, and is much the same as a trial and 
may terminate a final order. 
Black's Law Dictionary 367 (5th Edition). If no parties are 
present, no testimony can be taken, no foundation for 
competent evidence laid, and generally insufficient grounds 
on which the hearing officer can base a decision. Had the 
arresting officer appeared, the Department could have 
conducted a "hearing." However, the failure of both parties 
to appear precluded the Department from holding any kind of 
meaningful hearing to which Cordova was entitled, even in 
her absence. 
The Commission as an administrative body may be 
justified in taking the position that it is not 
necessarily bound to adhere to the technical rules of 
evidence and procedure as applied in the courts. 
Nevertheless, wherein it is performing a duty of a 
judicial nature in which the findings of facts and the 
adjudication of important rights is involved, care 
should be taken that the procedures should comport with 
standards of fairness and due process. 
Club Stanyon Street v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 615 
P.2d 435, 436 (Utah 1980). 
The statute controlling the Department's DUI "refusal" 
hearings lends support to the contention that the Department 
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did not hold a "per se" hearing as required,1 Kith 
"refusal" cases, the Department may suspend a driver's 
license automatically upon a failure of the Petitioner to 
appear on the date set for the hearing. 
(c) If a hearing is requested by the person and 
conducted by the division, and the division determines 
that the person was requested to submit to a chemical 
test or tests and refused to submit to the test or 
tests, or if the person fails to appear before the 
division as required in the notice, the division shall 
revoke his license or permit.. .. 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 41-6-44.10 (2) (f) (Supp. 1992) (emphasis 
added). No such provision is contained in the "per se" 
statute. Were it the intent of the Legislature to permit 
the Department to default the Petitioner and forego 
administrative hearings where the "per se" Petitioner fails 
to appear, it would have so indicated by including similar 
language in the "per se" statute. 
The District Court recognized that "a hearing and 
findings supported by a modicum of competent legal evidence 
is an appropriate and necessary safeguard to protect 
Petitioner and persons similarly situated from having their 
driving privilege taken from them without due process of 
law." (R. at 46.) Having determined that Cordova was not 
accorded the due process rights to which she was 
1 "Refusal" hearings pertain to situations where the 
Petitioner fails to submit to chemical tests as required, 
and are governed by Utah Code Ann. Sec. 41-6-44.10 (Supp. 
1992). (Attached as Addendum C.) "Per se" hearings are 
held subject to the requirements of Sec. 41-2-130 in 
situations where the petitioner does submit to the required 
chemical tests. 
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entitled, the court correctly vacated and set aside the 
administrative action. This comports with the scheme of the 
"per se" statute, Utah Code Ann. Sec. 41-2-130, in its 
recognition that the division has no authority to suspend 
except after a "hearing." "(g) After the hearing, the 
division shall order whether the person's license to operate 
a motor vehicle be suspended or not." Utah Code Ann. Sec. 
41-2-130(6)(g). 
B. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT'S INFORMAL 
ADJUDICATORY PROCEEDINGS BY TRIAL DE NOVO DOES NOT 
RELIEVE THE DEPARTMENT OF ITS OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE 
CORDOVA WITH AN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING. 
Appellant believes that Cordova's statutory right to a 
trial de novo before the district court relieves the 
Department of its obligation to conduct a hearing. That 
notion, however, is contrary to the administrative hearing 
concept, and compromises the entire administrative process. 
The purpose of judicial review of administrative 
decision making is to ensure that agency determinations are 
not made arbitrarily, and that minimum due process standards 
are maintained. 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law Sec. 555 
(1962)• When an agency fails to hold a hearing as required 
by statute, that agency has clearly failed to meet that 
minimum standard. Although a trial de novo review of an 
administrative hearing provides the Petitioner with an 
additional opportunity to present his or her case, it in no 
manner relieves the administrative agency of its obligation 
to conduct a hearing. 
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One purpose of the administrative hearing is to allow 
those with experience in a particular field to make a 
decision based on their specialized knowledge* That purpose 
is contravened when an agency can avoid responsibility by 
relying on the reviewing court to make decisions on its 
behalf. Judicial review should provide a "check" on the 
administrative system, not take the place of the system. 
Accordingly, the availability of judicial review by trial de 
novo cannot cure the procedural defect of the complete lack 
of a hearing at the administrative level. To hold that a 
trial de novo under such circumstances would satisfy the 
Petitioner's right to due process, would undermine the 
administrative process, and render informal adjudicatory 
proceedings superfluous. The district court has some 
responsibility to vouchsafe this notion, otherwise Utah Code 
Ann. Sec. 63-46b-17, attached as Addendum D, is meaningless. 
This statute clearly provides that in granting relief in 
either a formal or informal setting, it may, inter alia, set 
aside or modify agency action or otherwise order other 
agency action, including further agency proceedings. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT IS NOT REQUIRED TO HOLD A TRIAL 
DE NOVO WHERE ADEQUATE GROUNDS EXIST TO SET ASIDE THE 
DEPARTMENT'S ORDER WITHOUT THE NEED FOR A COMPLETE 
TRIAL. 
Had the Department accorded Cordova the hearing to 
which she was entitled, the district court could have 
proceeded with a review by trial de novo. However, the lack 
of an administrative hearing precluded a trial de novo as 
there was no informal adjudicatory proceeding for the court 
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to review. This is particularly relevant where, as here, 
judicial review is by trial de novo "on the record."2 
In University of Utah v. Industrial Commission, 736 
P.2d 630 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court had an 
opportunity to comment on the adequacy of a trial de novo 
review of a decision of the Industrial Commission. The 
court ruled that in the context of an appeal of an 
antidiscrimination case, the district court could affirm the 
findings of the Industrial Commission, or make its own 
findings. The reviewing court "was not bound by the record, 
but may supplement the record, create an entirely new 
record, or elect to do a combination of these." Id. at 634. 
See also, Salt Lake City Corp. v. Confer, 674 P.2d 632 (Utah 
1983) . 
The same rationale supports the district court's 
decision in regard to Cordova. The court reviewed the 
record, and made an independent determination that the 
procedures accorded Cordova and the evidence presented at 
the administrative hearing were insufficient to justify the 
suspension of her license. Accordingly, the court vacated 
and set aside the administrative order. The decision 
comports with the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA)3 
statement that in granting relief from an agency 
2 The implications of "on the record" trial de novo are 
discussed in greater detail in "Point II", infra. 
3 Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-46-1 to -22 (1989). 
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adjudicatory proceeding, the district court may "set aside 
or modify agency action." Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-46b-
17(b)(iv) (1989). 
Having decided thusly, it would have been a waste of 
judicial resources to hold a trial de novo where facts 
existed which enabled the district court to reach its 
conclusion that the agency action was improper. As stated 
in University of Utah v. Industrial Commission: 
A trial judge is accorded broad discretion in 
determining how a trial shall proceed in his or her 
courtroom. If a trial can be held with expedience, 
i.e., if the days required for trial can be minimized 
without any compromise of the rights of the parties, 
certainly this is beneficial to the interests of 
judicial economy and resolution of disputes. The 
district court's procedure here, although falling 
somewhere between a new trial and a review of the 
record, was proper. 
Id, at 633. As the above passage indicates, the district 
court is not required to hold a complete judicial review by 
trial de novo where it can reach a decision based on the 
information at its disposal. 
II• ASSUMING THAT THE DISTRICT COURT IS REQUIRED TO CONDUCT 
JUDICIAL REVIEW BY TRIAL DE NOVO, THE DECISION TO VACATE AND 
SET ASIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER SHOULD STILL BE UPHELD. 
A. TRIAL DE NOVO REVIEW OF DEPARTMENT'S "PER SE" 
LICENSE SUSPENSION HEARINGS IS "ON THE RECORD." 
All Department of Public Safety hearings are, by 
designation, informal adjudicative proceedings. Utah Admin. 
R. 708-17-6 (1992). Therefore, judicial review of the 
Department's hearings is governed by the UAPA as follows: 
"The district courts shall have jurisdiction to review by 
trial de novo all final agency actions resulting from 
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informal adjudicative proceedings, Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-
46b-15(l)(a) (Supp. 1992). 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the term "trial 
de novo" has two different meanings: "(1) A complete retrial 
upon new evidence; (2) a trial upon the record made before 
the lower tribunal." Denver & R.G.W.R. Co. v. Public 
Service Commission, 98 Utah 431, 436, 100 P.2d 552, 554 
(1940) . The form of trial de novo which is used in a 
particular instance is "dictated by the wording and context 
of the statute in which it appears and by the nature of the 
administrative body, decision and procedure being reviewed." 
Pledger v. Cox, 626 P.2d 415, 416-17 (Utah 1981). 
The Pledger test, as applied to "per se" drivers 
license suspension hearings, makes it clear that judicial 
review of such actions is "on the record" within the second 
meaning of "trial de novo." 
In Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., the Court placed particular 
emphasis on the wording of the statute at issue which 
provided for "plenary review" in the district court as a 
trial de novo. 98 Utah at 436, 100 P.2d at 554. The Utah 
Supreme Court interpreted that statute as requiring a trial 
de novo "on the record." 
To review an action is to study or examine it again. 
Thus, "trial de novo" as used here must have a meaning 
consistent with the continued existence of that which 
is to be again examined or studied. If in these cases, 
the first meaning were applied to the use of the term 
"trial de novo" then one could not consistently speak 
of it as a review, as the Commission's action would no 
longer exist to be re-examined or re-studied. 
Id. at 436, 100 P.2d at 555. 
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The wording and context of the UAPA supports a similar 
conclusion. As noted, the UAPA requires the district court 
to "review by trial de novo" all license suspension 
hearings. As in Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., the term "review" 
presupposes the continued existence of the Department's 
action, and therefore review should be "on the record." 
On the record review of "per se" license suspension 
hearings also accords with the second prong of the Pledger 
test concerning "the nature of the administrative body, the 
decision and procedure being reviewed." Although Pledger 
held that, in the context of driver's license suspension 
hearings the term trial de novo should be "a complete 
retrial upon new evidence" as opposed to "on the record," 
that language is inapposite here inasmuch as Pledger 
involved a "refusal" hearing (as opposed to a "per se" 
hearing) decided prior to the enactment of the UAPA. 626 
P.2d 415 
Appellant incorrectly cites Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 
790 P.2d 587 (Utah App. 1990), as support for its argument 
that trial de novo in Cordova's situation is within the 
first Pledger definition. Brinkerhoff held that the 
Petitioner "was able to present his entire case before a new 
tribunal for an independent decision." Id, at 590. This 
reasoning, however, is more consistent with "on the record" 
trial de novo. Under either definition, the court has the 
discretion to hear new evidence from the parties. The 
primary distinction between the two forms of trial de novo 
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is that in an uon the record" review, the court may use the 
administrative record to assist in its determination. 
The Administrative Regulations of the Department are 
consistent with an "on the record" trial de novo. 
Record. The presiding officer may choose to make a 
verbatim recording or record the testimony, information 
and documents on forms provided by the division with 
"quotations of the verbatim testimony" sufficient for 
court review. 
Utah Admin.R. 708-17-8(8) (1992). Furthermore, the 
presiding officer is required to make a brief written 
summary of the hearing containing material facts, his or her 
recommendation for agency action, findings of fact and 
conclusions, and reasons for the recommendation, "in any 
form calculated to facilitate the proceeding and review." 
Utah Admin.R. 708-17-9(6) (1992). The fact that both of the 
cited regulations anticipate that the administrative record 
will be utilized on review, is evidence that the second 
prong of the Pledger test—the nature of the administrative 
body, decision and procedure being reviewed—also indicates 
that trial de novo review of the Department's informal 
adjudicatory proceedings should be "on the record." 
Again a review of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-46b-17 
(Addendum D) is enlightening, as it demonstrates the broad 
discretion which the district court has to fashion a remedy. 
This would not be so if the district court were left with 
absolutely no vestige of authority to inquire into agency 
proceedings and take action based solely thereon when 
appropriate and necessary. 
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B. SINCE DISTRICT COURT REVIEW OF "PER SE" LICENSE 
SUSPENSION HEARINGS IS "ON THE RECORD/' THE "RESIDUUM 
RULE" IS APPLICABLE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW, 
As discussed, trial de novo review of the Department's 
informal adjudicatory proceedings is "on the record". 
Accordingly, the district court may determine whether a 
modicum of legal evidence existed at the administrative 
hearing to satisfy the "residuum rule." 
The residuum rule holds that, "Although administrative 
agencies may rely upon hearsay evidence, a residuum of 
competent legal evidence must support the agencies' 
findings." Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 
App. 1987). The agencies' findings, however, "cannot be 
based exclusively on hearsay evidence." Yacht Club v. Utah 
Liquor Control Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 1984). 
While hearsay evidence may become legally competent, it 
first must be properly admitted. Industrial Power v. 
Industrial Commission, 187 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 31 (Utah 
1992). Such was not the case here. 
Similar to Kehl, Cordova's arresting officer did not 
testify, nor did anyone else. Accordingly, all of the 
evidence considered by the hearing officer was inadmissible 
hearsay. While the evidence might have been admissible had 
a proper foundation been laid, the absence of any testimony 
to that effect rendered all of the evidence inherently 
unreliable. 
In Kehl, the lack of foundational testimony as to 
whether the arresting officer's DUI report was prepared in 
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the regular course of business contemporaneously with the 
arrest of Kehl, led the appellate court to rule that the 
report could not be admitted as a business record exception 
to the hearsay rule- 735 P.2d at 417 (citing Utah R.Evid. 
803(6))- Similarly, the absence of testimony as to the 
qualifications of the officer to administer the chemical 
test rendered the results of that test inadmissible under 
the public records exception. Id. (citing Utah R.Evid. 
803(8) (B)) . 
As in Kehl, the fact that a proper foundation was not 
ascertained in regard to the evidence considered by 
Cordova's hearing officer, rendered the evidence inherently 
unreliable. Therefore, there was not "a residuum of 
competent legal evidence to support the agency's finding," 
(Findings at 3; R. at 46.), and the district court's ruling 
to that effect should be upheld. 
C. CORDOVA'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE 
AT THE DEPARTMENT "HEARING" DOES NOT RENDER THE 
EVIDENCE LEGALLY COMPETENT AND SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY 
THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE RESIDUUM RULE. 
Appellant argues that Cordova's failure to object to 
the evidence at the administrative proceeding rendered the 
evidence legally competent for purposes of the "residuum 
rule." That argument is without merit. The "residuum rule" 
is not a rule of evidence. It is a substantive legal 
requirement, which goes to the heart of the basis for the 
administrative order. To permit the Department to suspend 
Cordova's driver's license based on such evidence would be 
to allow form to triumph over substance. The import of the 
15 
residuum rule is more fundamental than the mere question of 
waiver of otherwise incompetent evidence. 
The district court concluded that, "[Appellant's] 
argument is not compelling. Though it may have been had the 
arresting officer or other witnesses for the State appeared 
and testified." (Findings at 3; R. at 46.) Had such 
witnesses appeared, testimony could have been elicited as to 
the foundation for the evidence, and if satisfactory, the 
evidence could properly be admitted. Absent such testimony, 
the evidence is inherently unreliable, and therefore not 
legally competent regardless of whether or not Cordova 
objects. Kehl, 735 P.2d at 417. 
CONCLUSION 
The failure of the Department to hold an administrative 
hearing denied Cordova her right to due process prior to the 
suspension of her driver's license. The district court was 
correct in holding that Cordova was prejudiced thereby, and 
its judgment vacating and setting aside the administrative 
order should be affirmed. 
If this court determines that the district court should 
have held a trial de novo, then judicial review is "on the 
record," and the "residuum rule" is applicable. Accordingly, 
the absence of a modicum of legally competent evidence 
provides sufficient grounds for the reversal of the 
administrative order. As neither side was prejudiced by the 
district court's failure to conduct a trial de novo, the 
judgment below should be affirmed. 
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ADDENDUM A 
UTAH CODE ANN. SEC. 41-2-130 (Supp. 1992) 
41-2-130 MOTOR VEPHCLES 
the name of the chapter reference m Suhsec- changed the st\ le of the chapter references 
tion (12)(a) throughout, and made oner st\hsuc changes 
The 1991 amendment b\ ch 190, effectne This section is set out a* re^oncil^d bv the 
October 1 1991 inserted '-u pension or' m Office of Legislative R search and General 
Subsection (lXa), subdivided Subsection (otfa1, Counbel 
41-2-130. Chemical test for driving under the influence — 
Temporary li ense — Hearing and decision — 
Suspension and fee — Judicial review. 
(1) (a) When a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person 
may be violating or has violated Sec ion 4 -6-44, the peace officer may, in 
connection with arresting the person, request that the person submit to a 
chemical test or tests to be administered m compliance with the stan-
dards under Section 41-6-44.10. 
(b) In this section, a reference to Section 41-6-44 includes any similar 
local oidmance adopted m compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1) 
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the person s submission 
to a chemical test that a test result indicating a violation of Section 41-6-44 
shall, and the existence of a blood alcohol content sufficient to render the 
person incapable of safely driving a vehicle may, result m suspension or revo-
cation of the person's iicense to operate a motor vehicle 
(3) If the person submits to a chemical test and the test results indicate a 
blood or breath alcohol content m violation of Section 41-6-44, or if the officer 
makes a determination, based on reasonable grounds, that the person is other-
wise m violation of Section 41-6-44, the officer directing administration of the 
test or makm j the determination shall serve on the per jn, on behalf of the 
division, immediate notice of the division's intention to suspend the person's 
license to operate a vehicle 
(4) (a) When the officer serves immediate notice on behalf of the division 
he shall-
(l) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the opera-
tor; 
(u) issue a temporary license certificate effective for only 29 days, 
and 
(in) supply to the operator, on a form to be approved by th* divi-
sion, basic information regarding how to < otam a prompt h .ring 
before the division 
(b) A citation issued by the officer may, if approved as to form by the 
division, ser\e also as the temporary license certificate 
(5) The peace officer serving the notice shall send to the division w ithm five 
days after the date of arrest and service of the notice. 
(H) the person s license certificate, 
(b) a copy of the citation issued for the offense; 
(c) a signed icport on a form approved Ly the division indicating the 
chemical test results, if any, and 
(d) any other basis fur the officer's determination that th \ D ^ O I has 
violated Section 4tl-b-44 
(6) (a) Upon written *eq ^ t , the division c hall grant > clio { erson
 t n o^ 
portunity to be he aid swihm ?9 da^s oilu. the dj»te oi ^ o5i fhe i ctu ^ 
shall lo made ^ ithm len cl lys of the cL-J „ of the t u c t 
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(b) A hearing, if held, shall bo before the division in the county in 
which the arrest occurred, unless the division and the person agree that 
the hearing nay be held in some other county. 
(c) The he ring shall be documented and shall cover the issues of: 
(i) v/h her a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the 
person v ; operating a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44; 
(ii) hither the person refused to submit to the test; and 
(iii) the test results, if any. 
(d) In connection with a he' :ing the division or its authorized agent 
may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas r the attendance of 
witnesses and the production of relevant books a,id papers. 
(e) One or more members of the division may conduct the hearing. 
(0 Any decision made after a hearing before any number of the mem-
bers of the division is as valid as if made after a hearing before the full 
membership of the division. 
(g) A lev the hearing, the division shall order whether the person's 
license to operate a motor vehicle be suspended or not. 
(7) (a) A first suspension, whether ordered or not challenged under this 
subsection, is for a period of 90 days, beginning on the 30th day after the 
^date of the arrest. 
(b) A s jcond or subsequent suspension under this subsection is for a 
period of one year, beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest. 
(8) (a) The division shall assess against a person, in addition to any fee 
imposed under Subsection 41-2-112(15), a fee under Section 41-2-103, 
which shall be paid before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to 
cover administrative costs. This fee shall be cancelled if the person ob-
tains an unappealed division hearing or court decision that the suspen-
sion was not proper. 
(b) A person whose license has been suspended by the division under 
this subsection may file a petition within 30 days after the suspension for 
a hearing on the matter which, if held, is governed by Section 41-2-131. 
History: C. 1953, 41-2-19.6, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 99, § 6; 1987, eh. 129, § 2; renum-
bered bv L. 1987, ch. 137, § 30; 1990, ch. 30, 
§ 6; 1992, ch. 21, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, redesignated 
the former second and third sentences of Sub-
section (3) as present Subsection (4), former 
Subsection (4) as present Subsections (5Xa) to 
(5Xd), former Subsection (5) as present Subsec-
tion (6), the second sentence in former Subsec-
tion (5)(b) as present Subsections (6Xc)(i) to 
(GXcXiii), the former third and fourth sen-
tences of former Subsection (5Xb) as present 
Subsections (6Xd) and (6)(e), former Subsection 
(5Xc) as present Subsections (6)(f) and (6)(g\ 
and former Subsections (5Xd) and (5)(e) as 
present Subsections (7), (8Xa), and (8)(b); sub-
stituted "Subsection 41-2-112(14)" for "Subsec-
tion 41-2-112(6)" in the first sentence in 
present Subsection (8)(a); and made stylistic 
changes. 
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 
1992, in Subsection (4) added the (a) and (b) 
designations, redesignating former Subsec-
tions i4)(a) to (c) as Subsections (4)(a)(i) to (iii); 
in Subsections (4)(a)(ii) and (6Xa) substituted 
"29 days" for "30 days"; subdivided Subsection 
(7), substituted "30th day" for "31st day "in 
both subsections, and substituted "one year" 
for "120 days"in Subsection (7)(b); and in Sub-
section t8Xa) substituted "41-2-112(15)" for 
"41-2-112(14)." 
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ADDENDUM B 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
J l e r s c h e l f a l l e n ( 0 4 3 2 ) 
McDON LI) \ : 'JLLEN 
ntton.e ' far Petitioner 
•'.•'ho Her les Building 
455 L'ast Fifth South, Suite* 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telophone: (801) 359-0999 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
>TATE OF UTAH 
* oooQooo-— 
JUDY A. CORDOVA, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, Bureau 
Chief, Records Eureau, Drivers 
License Division, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 920901040 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Respondent. 
oooOooo 
The above captioned matter came on before the Honorable J. 
Dennis Frederick on the 30th day of April, 1992, at the hour of 
9:00 a.m., Herschel Bullen appearing for the Petitioner and Thorn 
Roberts, Assistant Attorney General, appearing for the Respondent. 
The Petitioner having made a Motion to Vacate and Set Aside the 
administrative Order suspending the. driving privilege of the 
Petitioner, based upon the exhibits received, the pleadings and 
record of the case and having heard argument of counsel, the Court 
now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. An administrative hearing regarding the Department of 
Public Safety Driver's License Division's intention to suspend the 
Petitioner's driving privileges as a result of Petitioner's arrest 
for driving under the influence of clcohol or L.ay drug on January 
24, 1992
 f was scheduled yuxcuexvt to Vivtitionor1 r; request on or 
about February 19, 1992,, at the hour of 9 s00 C^KU, at 27C0 Uest 
4700 South, West Valley City, Utah. 
2* The record of the administrative suspension hearing 
reflect! that "no one appeared for the hearing", and no witnesses 
te Jtified whatsoever, not the arresting officer, the operator of 
the breathilyzer, the Petitioner, nor anyone else,' The evidence 
apparently considered at the hearing ?as the arresting officer*s 
D.U.I. Report form, a copy of the operational check list, a 
breathilyzer test result, and the Utah Department of Public 
Safety's "record of intoxilyzer test and affidavit" for the day 
January 22, 1992. 
3. The Department of Public Safety issued its Order 
suspending the Petitioner's driving privilege. 
4. The Order of the Department of Public Safety, effective 
12:01, a.m., on February 23, 1992, states that, 
"the basis for such action is findings of fact 
and conclusion by the hearing officer for the 
Department that a peace officer had reasonable 
grounds that you were operating, or were in 
physical control of a motor vehicle while 
under the influence in violation of, or failed 
to request a hearing, contrary toU.C.A. 41-6-
44 and U.C-A. 41-2-130." 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes 
and enters the following 
2 
CONCLUSIONS OF LA\1 
!• T'Jith respect to Respondent*::; argument that Petitioner's 
failure to appear at the rdraini^trative hearing constitutes a 
\v&:Lvor oi her :ri;;tt to object to the basic of the Respondent's 
Order of B\^'oons±onr the Court concludes that that argument is not 
compelling * though it may have be<^n had the arrest "ing officer or 
other witnesses for t *e State appeared and testified. 
2. The llresiduum rule" set forth in Kehl v. Schwendiman. 735 
P.2d 413 (Ct. of App. 1987) is applicable to this fact situation 
and requires that some degree or modicum of competent legal 
evidence support the Respondent agencyf s findings. 
3. In as much as there was not a residuum of competent legal 
evidence to support the agency's finding, this Court concludes that 
-the determination of the Department of Public Safety Driver's 
License Division to suspend the driving privilege of the Plaintiff 
was arbitrary and capricious, 
4. The requirement of a hearing and findings supported by a 
modicum of competent legal evidence is an appropriate and necessary 
safeguard to protect Petitioner and persons similarly situated from 
having their driving privilege ;aken from them without due process 
of lav/. 
5. This court is not compelled to hold a trial de novo in all 
cases, otherwise the administrative process would be valueless and 
not subject to judicial review. 
3 
G. The objection raised by the Petitioner is not ! ;;rely 
technical, non-prejudicial . .id procedural, arid trial ds novo would 
iiot be the proper remedy to cure such prejudicial error. 
Dated this day of May, 1992. 
J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGi£ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
THOM D. ROBERTS 
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ADDENDUM C 
UTAH CODE ANN. SEC. 44-6-44.10 (Supp. 1992) 
41-6-44.8 MOTOR VEHICLES 
41-6-44.8. Municipal attorneys for .*-pacified offenses may 
prosecute for certain DUI offenses and driving 
while license suspended or revoked. 
The following class A misdemeanors may be prosecuted by attorneys of 
cities and towns, as well as by prosecutors authorized elsewhere in this code to 
prosecute these alleged violations: 
(1> alleged class A misdemeanor violations of Subsection 41-6-44-
(6)(a)(ii); and 
(2) alleged violations of Section 41-2-136, which consist of the person 
operating a vehicle while his operator's license is suspended or revoked 
for a violation of Section 41-6-44, a local ordinance which complies with 
the requirements of Section 41-6-43, Section 41-6-44.10, Section 76-5-207, 
or a criminal prohibition that the person was charged with violating as a 
result of a plea bargain after having been originally charged with violat-
ing one or more of those sections or ordinances. 
History: C. .1953, 41-8-44.8, enacted by L. made a related stylistic change in present Sub-
1983, ch. 102, § 1; 1987, ch. 138, § 40; 1990, section (2). 
ch. 299, § 2; 1991, ch. 147, § 2. The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- 1991, deleted "or a local ordinance similar to 
ment, effective April 23, 1990, added the intro- Subsection 41-6-44(6)(a)(ii) that complies with 
ductory paragraph and Subsection (1); desig- therequirementsof Section 41-6-43" at the end 
nated the former section as Subsection (2); and of Subsection (1). 
41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or 
drug — Number of tests — Refusal — Warning, 
report — Hearing, revocation of license — Ap-
peal — Person incapable of refusal — Results of 
test available — Who may give test — Evidence. 
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to 
have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or 
urine for the purpose of determining whether he was operating or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44 or 41-8-44.4, 
ox while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alco-
hol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, if the test is or tests are adminis-
tered at the direction of a peace officer having grounds to believe that 
person to have been operating or in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohib-
ited under Section 41-6-44 c 41-6-4- 4, or while under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, or corr unation of alcohol and any drug under Section 
41-6-44. 
(b) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered 
and how many of them are administered, except the officer shall request 
that either the blood or urine test be administered under Section 
76-5-207. If an officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person to 
take one or more requested tests, oven though ho does submit to any other 
requested test or tests, is a refusal under this section. 
AuA 
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(c) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to a 
chemic 1 test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, may not select the test 
or tests to be administered. The failure or inability of a peace officer to 
arrange for any specific chemical test is not a defense to taking a test 
requested by a peace officer, and it is not a defense in any criminal, civil, 
or administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit 
to the requested test or tests. 
(2) (a) If th 3 person has been placed under arrest, has then been requested 
by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests under 
Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to any chemical test requested, the 
person shall be warned by the peace officer requesting the test or tests 
that a refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in revocation of the 
person's license to operate a motor vehicle. Following this warning, un-
less the person immediately requests that the chemical test or tests as 
offered by a peace officer be administered, no test may be given. 
(b) A peace officer shall serve on the person, on behalf of the division, 
immediate notice of the division's intention to revoke the person's privi-
lege or license to operate a motor vehicle. When the officer serves the 
immediate notice on behalf of the division, he shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the opera-
tor; 
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 30 days; and 
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the division, 
basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the divi-
sion. 
1
 (c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if approved as to form by 
the division, serve also as the temporary license. 
(d) The peace officer shall submit a signed report, within five days after 
the date of the arrest, that he had grounds to believe the arrested person 
had been operating or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited un-
der Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4 or while under the influence of alcohol or 
any drug or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44 
and that the person had refused to submit to a chemical test or tests 
under Subsection (1). 
(e) A person who has been notified of the division's intention to revoke 
his license under this section is entitled to a hearing. A request for the 
hearing shall be made in writing within ten days after the date of the 
arrest. Within 20 days after receiving a written request, the division shall 
notify the person of his opportunity to be heard as early as practicable. If 
the person does not make a timely written request for a hearing before 
the division, his privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Utah shall be 
revoked for a period of one year beginning on the 31st day after the date 
of arrest. 
(f) If a hearing is requested by the person and conducted by the divi-
sion, and the division determines that the person was requested to submit 
to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test or tests, or if 
the person fails to appear before the division as required in the notice, the 
division shall revoke his license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in 
Utah for one year, beginning on the date the hearing is held. The division 
shall also assess against the person, in addition to any fee imposed under 
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Subsection 41-2-112(15), a fee under Section 41-2-103, which shall be paid 
before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative 
costs, The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappeaied court 
decision following a proceeding allowed under this subsection that the 
revocation was improper, 
(g) (i) Any person whose license has beer, revoked by the division un-
der this section may seek judicial review. 
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a 
trial. Venue is in the district court in the county in which the person 
resides. 
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other ondition render-
ing him inca] able of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is consid-
ered to not ha^e withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1), and the 
test or tests may be administered wiiether the perso- has been arrested or not. 
(4) Upon the request of the person who was testeu, the results of the test or 
tests shall be made available to him. 
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person autho-
rized under Section 26-1-30, acting at the request of a • eace officer, may 
withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or drug content. This limita-
tion does not apply to the taking of a urine or breath specimen. 
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person autho-
rized under Section 26-1-30 who, at the direction of a peace officer, draws 
a sample of blood from any person whom a peace officer has reason to 
believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical facil-
ity at which the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or criminal 
liability arising from drawing the sample, if the test is administered 
according to standard medical practice. 
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician of 
his own choice administer a chemical test in addition to the te, '<: or tests 
administered at the direction of a peace officer. 
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect 
admissibility of the results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a 
peace officer, or preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the 
direction of a peace officer. 
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests adminis-
tered at the direction of a peace officer. 
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to c ubmit to a chemic 1 test or 
tests, the person to be tested does not have the rij it to consult an attorney or 
have an attorney, ; hysician, or other person present as a condition for the 
talking of any test. 
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemic I test or tests or 
any additional test under this section, evidence of any refusal is adm ;sible in 
any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts allegec to havrj 
been committed while the person was operating or in ctual physical contr I 
of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combi-
nation of alcohol and any drug. 
Hisi ry: C. 1953, 41-6-44.10, enacted by L. 
1981, , h. 123, § 43; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 16; 
1987, ch. 120, § 3; 1987, ch. 133, § 41; 1987, 
ch. 151, § 143; 1937 (1st S.S.), ch. 3, §§ 3, 4; 
1988, cb. 148, § 1; 1990, ch. 30, § 2J; 1902, 
oh. 73, § 3. 
Amendment Notes. —- The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1S90, substituted 
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'^specific chemical test" for "specific test'* in the 
secoj^i .sentence in Subsection (I)(.c); deleted 
"or any o.v;e or all of the tests" after "chemical 
test" ivi the first sentence in Subsection (2)(a); 
d^n&nated the former third and fourth sen-
tence?; in Subjection (2)(a) as )J esent Subsec-
tion (2Kb); designated the fir : two sentences 
in former Subsection (2)(a)(iii as present Sub-
sections (2)(c) and (d) and redesignated former 
Subsections (2)(b) to (2)(d) as present Subsec-
tions (2)(e) to (2)(g); and made stylistic 
changes. 
NOTES TO 
ANALYSIS 
Administration of test. 
Grounds for requesting test. 
Independent test. 
Prerequisites for admission into evidence. 
Proceeding to revoke iicense for failure i J sub-
mit to test. 
—Appeal moot. 
Refusal to submit to test. 
Right to refuse test. 
Cited. 
Administration of test. 
Defendant had no statutory or constitutional 
right to have the police provide her with a bot-
tle in order to collect a urine sample, and the 
fact that a police officer attempted to facilitate 
her request as a courtesy did not render the 
police responsible for the manner in which she 
collected the sample or her failure to effec-
tively pursue an analysis of that sample. Provo 
City'Corp. v. Werner, 810 P.2d 469 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). 
Grounds for requesting t e s t 
This section does not require an arrest prior 
to taking a blood sample, and allows drawing 
blood from an unconscious person with or with-
out an arrest. State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Independent test. 
The right afforded by the implied consent 
law is the right to seek to obtain an indepen-
dent test, not an absolute right to obtain a test. 
Pr< vo City Corp. v. Werner, 810 P.2d 469 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Prerequisi es for admission into evidence. 
This section was inapplicable to a defendant 
COLLATERAL 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal 
Law, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 177. 
KD REGULATIONS 41-6-44.10 
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 
1992, inserted '"'under Section 41-6-44 or 
41-6-44.4" in two places in Subsection (l)(o.) 
and in Subsection (2KdV, substituted "Subsec-
tion 41-2-112(15)" for "Subsection 41-2-112-
(14)" in the second sentence in Subsection 
(2)(f); ad sub ituted "Section 26-1-30" for 
"Subsecion 2( oOQ9)" in Subsections (5)(a) 
and (5)(bh 
DECISIONS 
who had not been placed under arrest before 
his blood was drawn. State v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 
122 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Proceeding to revoke license for failure to 
submit to test. 
—Appeal moot. 
Where the only issue on appeal was the sta-
tus of the defendant's license revocations, 
which were no longer in effect, and no cogniza-
ble collateral consequences were legally im-
posed on the defendant because of the now-ex-
pired revocations, the expiration of the defen-
dant's revocation periods mooted the appeals. 
Phillips v. Schwendiman, 802 P.2d 108 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
Refusal to submit to test. 
Driver's conduct was refusal when, although 
he verbally agreed to tests, he obstructed the 
process by sticking his tongue over and chew-
ing on the mouthpiece and blowing out the 
sides of his mouth, thereby preventing officers 
from obtaining an adequate, viable breath 
sample. Cowan v. Schwendiman, 769 P.2d 2S0 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Right to refuse test. 
Blood sample taken from a juvenile motorist 
who was not placed under arrest, who was not 
informed that he could refuse to submit to the 
test, and who did not consent thereto, was 
taken contrary to the provisions of this section, 
and the test results were therefore inadmissi-
ble. In re I.. 771 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1989), vacat-
ing 739 P.2d 1124 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (noted 
in bound volume under this catchline). 
Cited in Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 
42 (Utah 1989). 
REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Sufficiency of showing of physical 
inability to take tests for driving while intoxi-
cated to justify refusal, 68 A.L.R.4th 776. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. SEC. 63-46B-17 (1989) 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 63-46b-17 
(i) ihe persons taking the agency action were ^.legally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqi .lification; 
(Q • tho agency action is based upon a determination of ft .t, made or 
imp *,d by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record be re t) 3 court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rale of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justi-
fies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
History: C. 1953, 63-48b-18, enacted by L. appellate court" in Subsection (2)fa); and sub-
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, eh, 72, § 26. stituted "appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- pellat-court" for "Utah Rules of Appellate Pro-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, substituted "As
 cedur< in Subsections (2)(a) and (2Kb). 
provided by statute; the Supreme Coi: t or the Effective Dat <•;. Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
Court of Appeals" for "The Supr me Court or §
 ; n 5 m a k e s the act effective on Januarv l] 
)ther appellate court designatea by statute" in 3.933 
subsection (1); inserted "with the appropriate 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
'unction of district court, trict court will no longer function as intermedi-
Subsection (1) provides that all final agency ate appellate coi t except to review informal 
visions through formal adjudicative proceed- adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to 
tgs ••/ill.be reviewed by the Utah Supreme § 63-46b-15(l)(a). In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32 
Durt or Court of Appeals. Therefore, the dis- (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
3~48b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief. 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the 
district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an ap-
pellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the 
extent expressly authorized by statute, 
(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action re mired by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law; 
(iii) set aside or modify agency action; 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action; or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings. 
2) Decisions on petitions for judicia review of final agency action are re-
wable by a higher court, if authorized by statute. 
istory: C. 1953, 63-46b«17, enacted by L. § 315 makes the act effective on January 1, 
'f ch. 161, § 273. 1988. 
fective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
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ADDENDUM E 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-46b-15 (Supp. 1992) 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 63-46b-3.0 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm dis-
proportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaus-
tion. 
(A) (a) A -arty shall fas a petition for judicial review oflinal agency action. 
within SO dayr, alter t<a; date tbr-t the order constituting the final agency 
action is issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection 
63-46b-13(3)(b). 
(b) Tile petition shall name the zg2ncy and all other appropriate par-
ties as respondents and shall meet the form requirements specified in this 
chapter. 
History: C. 3A53, G3-40I>14, enacted by L, to have been issued under Subsection 
1937, ch! 161, § 270; Ifc&J, eh. 72, § 24. 63-46b-13(3)<bi" in Subsection (3); and made 
Amendment Notes. — The 1&88 amend- minor stylistic changes, 
rnent, effective April 25, 1988, divided former Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
Subsection (1) into present Subsections (1) and §
 3 1 5 r n a k e s the act effective on Januarv 1, 
(2) and redesignated former Subsection (2) as 1QS8. 
present Subsection (3); added t!or is considered 
S3-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo 
all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings. 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall 
be as provided in the statute governing the agency or, in the absence of 
such a venue provision, in the county where the petitioner resides or 
maintains his principal place of business. 
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings 
.. shall be a complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
shall include: 
(i) the name and mailing address of the party seeking judicial re-
view; 
(ii) the name and mailing address of the respondent agency; 
(iii) the title and date of the final agency action to be reviewed, 
together w ch a duplicate copy, summary, or brief description of the 
agency action; 
(iv) identification of the persons who were parties in the informal 
adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action; 
(v) a copy of the written agency order from the informal proceed-
ing; 
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party seeking judicial review is 
entitled to obtain judicial review; 
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the type and extent of relief 
requested; 
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to 
relief, 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of 
fact and law and any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings. 
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63-46b-16 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings v ider 
section. 
History: C. 1953, 63«46b-15, enacted by L. according to the standards of 
1987, ch. 161, § 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 25. S3-46b-16(4)" at the end in SubsecUoMlK^ 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- and made minor stylistic changes. ' #1! 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, deleted "except Effective Dates. — Laws 1987 ch Ifiv^ 
that final agency action from informal adjudi- § 315
 m a k e s the act effective on Januarv1 
cative proceedings based on a record shall be 1988. ^ 
reviewed by the district courts on the record 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Function of district court. the district court will no longer function as &. 
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final termediate appellate court except to review I Q ^ 
agency decisions through formal adjudicative formal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursu ^ 
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Su- ant to Subsection QXa) of this section. In rel 
preme Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)- ^ 
63-48h~16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeais nas 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings.
 : ^ 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal' 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required 
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Files of 
Appellate Procedure, except tl at: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, sum-
marize, or organize • le record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
short: a, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The app late court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has b en substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the foliowir -;: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional ou its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted hovond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat-
ute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all ot' the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(0) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-mak-
ing process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
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